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PARITY, FAMILY SIZE PREFERENCE AND THE "VALUE STRETCH"
Virginia AldigerHiday
North Carolina State University at Raleigh
Steven Polgar
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
ABSTRACT
A two-wave survey of women in their reproductive years living in
poverty areas of New York City is used to investigate family size
preferences among the poor. The hypotheses that parity affects family
size preference and that current parity affects future parity are sup-
ported. Implications for future trends in family size preference and
for family planning programs are discussed.
Most explanations of differential reproductive patterns are based
upon the assumption of a direct and one-directional causal link from
desired family size to actual family size (Figure 1, A) (Easterlin,
1969; Freedman, 1974; Namboodiri, 1970; Votey, 1969). Underlying this
assumption is a 'motivationalist" view of reproductive behavior
(Polgar, 1972). While it is usually recognized that voluntary natality
regulation does not operate perfectly, the extent and complex causation
of failures in family planning have not been given sufficient atten-
tion in most studies of differential birth rates.
We argue that besides family size preference affecting parity,
two additional causal mechanisms are operative (Figure 1, B): I) parity
affects family size preference (lines a); and 2) present parity affects
future parity (line b). Furthermore, we argue that the concept of
"value stretch" (Rodman, 1963) informs the relationship between desired
and actual family size among the poor. To investigate these relation-
ships in this paper we examine preference and parity differences in
pregnancy experience over a two-year span among women of low income
neighborhoods in a metropolitan area.
A number of studies in social psychology have emphasized that
behavior influences attitudes at least as often as attitudes determine
behavior (Deutscher, 1973). Yet, most demographic analyses neglect
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Figure 1: Two Causal Models of Preference and Parity
A:
Preference N Preference - o Preference
TI  T 2  T 3
Parity Parity
T 2  T 3
B:
Preference )p Preference - Preference
Parity 
b- 
. Parity
T 2  T3
the causal effects of actual childbearing on expressed family size
preferences. When environmental circumstances (or physiological prob-
lems) reduce the likelihood of successful natality planning, the prob-
ability that actual family size will significantly affect desired
family size is particularly strong; having unintentionally reached
higher parity levels at an early age may influence people to revise
their stated family size preferences upward (and problems of sterility
downward).
In the United States use of effective contraceptives and volun-
tary abortion, and success in planning a family have been found to be
directly related to such measures of social status as income and educa-
tion (Jaffe and Guttmacher, 1968; Ryder and Westoff, 1971; Whelpton,
et al., 1966; Whelpton and Kiser, 1958). Because couples with low
levels of income and education tend to have larger stated family
desires and expectations than those of average or higher socioeconomic
status (Namboodiri, 1974; Ryder and Westoff, 1969; Whelpton, et al.,
1966) as well as more births, it could be argued that the poor and
near-poor want to have large families. If this were the case, the
increase in public and private expenditures for family planning ser-
vices for the medically indigent in the last decade might have been
largely irrelevant for changing natality among the poor. Indeed, such
a line of reasoning has been advanced by some writers (Blake, 1969). 1
-1II .9.
This argument, however, ignores the possibility of behavior influenc-
ing attitudes on the one hand, and the obstacles to voluntary control
over reproduction among the poor and near-poor on the other. State-
ments about desired number of children may have been higher on the
average among the poor than among others in large part because many
poor couples of a given age or marital duration already have more
children than the non-poor.
There is considerable evidence that many women living in poverty
areas are at risk of having children at an early age and in rapid
succession, through an early age at initiation into sexual activity,
early marriage, and inadequate access to high quality family planning
services (Jaffe and Guttmacher, 1968; Furstenberg, 1971; Zelnick and
Kantner, 1972). Early and rapid childbearing leads to relatively high
parity levels by the time the woman is in her mid-twenties, with many
years of reproductive capacity left. Higher parity itself then may
contribute further to the obstacles to regulating childbirth. The
added burden of several children when trying to maintain a household
in a poverty environment may have a negative influence on contracep-
tive used, resulting in additional unintended births. Thus, expressed
preferences among the poor concerning family size, after three or more
children have already been born, may well reflect resignation in the
face of reality rather than a value position divergent from the non-
poor.
Hyman Rodman has described such a process as it occurs among the
lower class for aspects of life other than family size. He terms it
the "value stretch." Rodman argues that a large portion of the lower
class holds the same values as the middle class; but when they find
them impossible to attain, "stretch" them to include other choices
which are adaptive to the circumstances under which they live (Rodman,
1963).
Like Haney, et al. (1973), we think it worthwhile to follow the
implications of the "value-stretch" for reproductive behavior and
attitudes. We hypothesize that poor people have essentially the same
family planning desires as the non-poor. Insufficiently able to regu-
late their natality, these couples "stretch" their values in the
direction of the actual reproductive experience. Poor couples who
have more than two or three children, therefore, would change their
desired number of children upward to a compromise figure between the
number they have and the average number wanted in the larger society -
i. e., 2 to 3 (Blake, 1974).
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Support for the operation of a "value stretch" in shifting atti-
tudes toward actual experience in reproduction may be found not only
in the positive relationship between desired and actual number of
children (a finding that could as well support the explanation that
desired family size causes actual family size), but also by the non-
linearity of that relationship (Bauman and Udry, 1973; Bumpass and
Westoff, 1970). In the early stages of family building the number of
children desired generally exceeds the number actually born. When
parity approximates the society-wide average of 2 to 3 children wanted,
the desired number of children exceeds the actual number born, but
when parity exceeds the societal norm, family size preference falls
below the actual number of children already born. Furthermore, the
higher the parity above the norm, the greater the difference between
desired and actual numbers of children. This phenomenon, of course,
is found not only among poor couples in the United States, but in a
number of other populations as well (Freedman, et al., 1972; Hawley
and Prachuabmoh, 1966).
Additional support for poverty and high parity inducing a value
stretch in family size preference is found in studies which show a
sizeable reduction in the negative association between education and
desired family size when parity is controlled (Ryder and Westoff,
1971). Also, surveys have shown that stated number of unwanted births
increase as parity increases and as socioeconomic status declines
(Bauman and Udry, 1973; Bumpass and Westoff, 1970; Whelpton, et al.,
1966).
The concept of "value stretch" implies a somewhat different set
of psychological processes than the "rationalization" of births when
family size is different than was desired at an earlier point in time.
The term "rationalization" refers to the presumption that an "unwanted"
birth has after the fact become a "wanted" one (or vice versa) in the
mind of an individual parent. The value stretch hypothesis, by con-
trast, assumes that in a sub-group of society where it is often very
difficult to behave in accordance with the dominant values of society
(in this case having a family with two or three children), the values
are stretched (in this case, to say that three or four or five
children are also acceptable). While rationalization would predict a
linear rise in the number desired as the number born increases, the
"value stretch" concept would imply an increasing discrepancy between
actual family size and number desired as parity increases beyond the
third birth; this is because the "stretching" involves a compromise
between society-wide values and the alternative values (which are
less desirable but not rejected entirely).
At the same parity level that value stretch begins operating on
stated family size preference, so also does parity itself become a
factor in effective family size regulation. Besides all of the ob-
stacles to regulation of natality found in the environment of the
poor, women with three or more children have the added obstacles
associated with their large family size. High parity and low income
have been found to limit a woman's ability to plan and organize her
life in areas besides childbearing. Hiday (1975) found among a sample
of low income urban women that as parity increased there was a de-
crease in ability to organize and run a household to satisfy family
needs. A study of mother's management and child care in England re-
ported a marked decline in efficiency with both increasing family size
and lower social class (Douglas and Blomfield, 1958). Difficulties in
organizing a household, resulting from a combination of the stresses
of poverty and large family size, could also affect resort to family
planning services and contraceptive practice, causing nonuse, ineffec-
tive use or inconsistent use of natality regulating methods. Thus,
for at least some people living in poverty, failure in natality regu-
lation affects parity, which - in turn - leads to changes in family
size preferences and further use of contraception (c.f. Frisancho et
al., 1976).
RESEARCH DESIGN
Interviews were conducted in 1965 in four New York City health
districts (in Bronx, Brooklyn and queens) with 1187 Black, White,
Puerto Rican and West Indian womenL between the ages of 18 and 39,
who were residing in randomly selected households. The health dis-
tricts were chosen on the basis of their designation as a "poverty
area" and/or their having the lowest average incomes in the borough,
willingness of a neighborhood agency to provide space for family
planning services, and absence of any contraceptive clinic in the
vicinity. These criteria were established for the purpose of testing
a mobile service family planning program (Polgar, et al., 1966).
In 1967, 624 of the panel respondents in the 1965 survey were
reinterviewed, along with a new sample of 264 women of the same age
and family status from a comparable health district. The original
sample was reduced by exclusion of 189 women found to be permanently
infertile and 20 women outside the age limits. Although we attempted
to trace within New York City respondents who moved from their 1965
residence, an additional 354 women were not possible to locate again.
No significant differences were found between those lost and those
reinterviewed by ethnic group, education, work status, or interviewer.
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However, panel loss was significantly greater among three groups:
women not married, women from the poorest group (less than $2600 a
year family income), and women who were born in urban areas or whose
spouses were born in urban areas (or both). If women in these three
groups systematically vary in childbearing attitudes and behavior
then our results may be somewhat distorted.
Annual family income was below $3900 for 35.4 percent of our sam-
ple, between $3900 and $6500 for 43.1 percent, and above $6500 for
21.5 percent. Education was also relatively low: 31.1 percent held
a grade school education or less; 35.4 percent had some high school;
26.6 percent completed high school; and 6.9 percent had attended col-
lege.3
Because these data were collected for purposes other than testing
the effects that parity has on family size preference and future
family growth, and because the data are no longer accessible for
thorough reanalysis, we were forced to work with previously prepared
tables. Hence, the reader will note the new sample is included only
in Table II and that different parity categories are used in Table I
and Figure 2 than in other tables.
FAMILY SIZE PREFERENCES
The questions for eliciting information on attitudes toward fam-
ily size included: 1) (in 1965) "Would you like to have any (more)
children?"; 2) (in both 1965 and 1967) "If you were starting your
family, how many children would you want altogether?"; and 3) (in 1967)
"How about your (husband/boyfriend) -- would he like to have any (more)
children?"4 Table I presents a summary of the responses to the first
question. Our results are in line with previous research. The pro-
portion of respondents wanting more children declines with increasing
levels of parity. These results, controlled "or age, are significant
(p4 .001). Approximately 60 percent or more women within each age/
parity group want no more children. Desire for no more children is
especially marked among women at parity levels above two. Spouses'
reported desire for more children (data not shown) significantly de-
clines with increasing parity as well (pe.001).
Data on desired number of children (if starting reproductive life
anew) at the time of the second interview are summarized in Table II.
The relationship between parity and family size preference is positive
and nonlinear. Among women below 35 years of age, desired number of
children is greater than actual number of children up to parity 2;
while at parity 3 or more, the desired number is less than actual
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TABLE I: PERCENT WOMEN WANTING MORE CHILDREN IN
1965 BY PARITY AND AGE
Parity* Age 4 25** 25-34 _' 35 N
0-1 90.8 73.6 27.3 151
2 42.6 43.9 36.0 143
3 12.0 29.9 6.3 118
4+ 29.2 9.3 10.3 190
N 197 295 110 602
By chi square analysis:
*Parity effects controlling for age are significant ( p<.OOl).
**In age groups <35, parity effects are significant (p<.OOl).
***In age group 35, parity effects are significant (p<.OOl).
Because of small expected frequencies, these data were col-
lapsed with analysis done for parity C 2 and parity-.2.
TABLE II: MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN DESIRED IF START-
ING AGAIN IN 1967 BY PARITY AND AGE IN 1965
Parity* Age < 25" " 25-34 a35 N
0 2.8 2.3 1.0 24
1 2.4 2.4 2.4 169
2 2.7 2.7 2.9 208
3 2.9 2.7 3.3 158
4+ 3.7 3.2 3.5 272
N 182 450 199 831
By two-way analysis of variance correcting for unequal cells,
F test:
*Parity effects controlling for age are significant (p C.OOl).
*"Age effects controlling for parity are nonsignificant.
***Interaction effects are significant (p<.05).
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number (except among parity 3 women 35 years and over). As expected,
women who have more children than the society-wide average number of
two or three children wanted raise their desired number. As the
actual number of children rises the desired number is also raised; but
so does the gap between actual and desired numbers.
This still leaves open the question of how family size prefer-
ences change over time as a result of changes in parity. Our reason-
ing leads to the expectation that the birth of additional children to
women of parity three or above will lead to an increase in stated
family size preferences, but to a lesser level than would be the case
if such births were retrospectively "rationalized" as wanted. To in-
vestigate this hypothesis we studied responses on the number of child-
ren desired if starting again, by 1965 parity and by pregnancy experi-
ence in the interim between the two interviews, for women who had two
or fewer children and for women who had more than two children.
At the time of the first interview women who were to have an addi-
tionaT birth did not desire significantly more children than women who
were to have none in the interim, regardless of parity. The expected
difference between the two groups of women in desired number of child-
ren in the second interview is significant in the predicted direction
for women with more than 2 children (p<.O25); and, as expected, there
is no significant difference between the two groups of women with two
or fewer children. Figure 2 depicts the progression upward in desired
number of children and the increasing gap between desired and actual
number of children after parity three. This pattern is as predicted
in terms of the value stretch concept: family size preference does
not predict interim births, but rather interim births which raise
parity also significantly raise family size preference for women who
have more than the societal norm of 2-3 children.
FAMILY GROWTH
Besides poverty and high parity leading to "value stretch" in
family size preference, we argued that poverty and large family size
would aiso make the practice of family planning difficult. We expected
our high parity respondents to have more births between 1965 and 1967,
and in particular to have more accidental births. Both of these ex-
pectations were fulfilled. Among all respondents pregnancy experience
controlled for age increased significantly with parity (p<.05). Since
some of our respondents wanted to have more children and were not at-
tempting to limit births, we separately analyzed those whom who stated
in the first interview that they wanted no more children. Table III
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FIGURE 2: MEAN NUMBER OF CHILDREN DESIRED IN 1967 IF START
AGAIN BY PARITY IN 1965 AND 1965-1967 PREGNANCY
EXPERIENCE
3.0 3.27
2 3 4 5
Parity 1965
a ---- women with no additional births in 1965-1967 interim
b.... women with additional births in 1965-1967 interim
c - hypothetical line with desired number and actual number
identical
By difference of means test:
For women with z3 children, the difference in desired
number between a and b is significant (p 4.025).
For women with4 3 children, the difference in desired
number between a and b is not significant.
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presents these resujts by 1965 parity and age. The incidence of preg-
nancy increases significantly with parity when age is controlled
(p <.Ol). These pregnancies among women who stated two years earlier
that they wanted no more children represent failures in attempts to
regulate family size.
TABLE III: PERCENT BECOMING PREGNANT BETWEEN 1965-1967
AMONG WOMEN NOT WANTING MORE CHILDREN IN 1965
BY PARITY AND AGE IN 1965
Parity* Agec25"-  25-34 -  ,35 *-  N
0-1 12.5 0.0 12.5 30
2 25.8 18.8 0.0 83
3 27.3 18.6 0.0 91
4+ 58.8 30.6 21.1 167
N 82 198 91 371
By chi square analysis:
*Parity effects controlling for age are significant (p <.01).
-'Within age groups c35, parity effects are significant (p<.O5).
**- Within age group Z35, parity effects are nonsignificant.
Because of small expected frequencies, these data were
collapsed with analysis done for parity 62 and parity;,2.
Our findings describe approximately the same proportion of un-
wanted births as the data of Bumpass and Westoff (1970). They esti-
mate one-fifth of all births to be unwanted; however, their estimate
for unwanted births to the poor and near-poor (32%) is higher than
ours. Their measure of unwanted births was based on several questions
and was not asked prior to the birth of the child. Given the increase
in services available, it is quite possible that couples in poverty
areas of New York City were somewhat more successful in family plan-
ning in 1965-1967 than poor couples in other parts of the country in
1960-65.
In 1967 we also asked respondents who became pregnant in the
interim between the two interviews if those pregnancies were intended
or unintended ("Did you want to get pregnant at that time, or did it
just happen?"). Table IV presents the responses to this question.
Among women under the age of 35 years, 5 the incidence of unintended
pregnancy increases with increasing parity (p<.O01). Unintended
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pregnancies represent a very high proportion of all pregnancies (60.9
percent) ranging among parity and age groups from a low of 33.3 percent
to a high of 100.0 percent. Because this table includes both women who
in 1965 said that they wanted more children and women who wanted no
more children, the unintended pregnancies combine "number failures"
and "spacing failures."
TABLE IV: PERCENT STATING PREGNANCY UNINTENDED AMONG ALL
WOMEN WHO BECAME PREGNANT BETWEEN 1965-1967 BY
PARITY AND AGE IN 1965
Parity* Age 425** 25- 34 " *  ? 35 N
0-1 37.2 33.3 100 53
2 68.0 54.5 50 38
3 100.0 58.8 -- 24
4+ 90.9 71.4 76.9 59
N 86 72 16 174
By chi square analysis collapsing the data and analysis done
for parity A2 and parity "2:
*Parity effects controlling for age among women under the age
of 35 are significant (p 4.00l).
**Parity effects within age group <25 are significant (p<.OOl).
*-, Parity effects within age group 25-34 are nonsignificant.
**'Parity effects within age group Z35 are nonsignificant.
When unintended pregnancies were cross-tabulated against the re-
spondent's desire for more children stated at the time of the first
interview, reporting an unintended pregnancy was found to be more fre-
quent among the women who in 1965 said that they wanted no more chil-
dren (number failures), than among those who said they wanted more
(spacing failures), 76.2 percent, 46.7 percent respectively. Of all
unintended pregnancies the majority, 60.4 percent, were number fail-
ures.
These reports of unintentional pregnancies, though high, are
likely to represent an understatement of total family planning fail-
ures. Admitting failure is difficult. Both retrospective rationali-
zation and embarrassment vis-a-vis the interviewer would contribute
to the probable undercount of couples who were not successful in family
planning. One way to compensate for this is to include with unintended
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TABLE V: PERCENT WOMEN WITH PREGNANCIES EITHER STATED AS
UNINTENDED OR RATIONALIZED AMONG ALL RESPONDENTS
WHO BECAME PREGNANT, BY PARITY AND AGE IN 1965
Parity* Age< 25' -  25-34 -" = 3 5 N
0-1 37.2 33.3 100.0 53
2 72.0 81.8 50.0 38
3 100.0 88.2 24
4+ 100.0 94.3 92.3 59
N 86 72 16 174
By chi square analysis collapsing the data and analysis done
for parity L2 and parity * 2:
*Parity effects controlling for age among women under the age
of 35 are significant (p < .001).
*' Parity effects within age groups c 35 are significant (Pc .o0).
"'Parity effects within age group z35 are nonsignificant. Be-
cause of the small N, these data were collapsed with Fisher's
Exact Test done for parity52 and>> 2.
pregnancies those pregnancies which occurred to women who said that
they wanted no more children at the time of the first interview but
at the second interview stated that their pregnancies were intended.
Family planning failures rise from 60.9 percent to 72.4 percent of
all pregnancies by this calculation (see Table V). For women below
25 and 25-34 (there were only 16 pregnancies among those over 35)
parity is positively associated with accidental pregnancy (p <.001).
It is possible that some of the pregnancies we are counting as ration-
alized represent a genuine change of opinion by women either between
first interview and pregnancy or after experience with the previously
undesired child. On the other hand, any error on this side should be
more than compensated by the error of undercounting spacing failures
among women who wanted more children.
USE OF NATALITY REGULATING METHODS
It was expected that women at lower parity levels would regulate
their family size and spacing intervals by greater use of contracep-
tion and greater use of effective methods than women at higher parity.
This was not the case among our sample. We studied contraceptive
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use by parity and age at the time of the first interview. There were
no significant differences by parity. Two years later, at the time of
the second survey, there were still no significant differences between
parity groups when age was controlled (data not shown). Thus, neither
contraceptive use nor use of effective methods can explain the differ-
ence in unwanted births. Although there was a tendency for women at
parities 2 and 3 to report greater use of abortion, these data were
not considered adequate for statistical analysis (see Polgar and Fried,
1976).
We cannot adequately assess the consistency of contraceptive use
from our survey data. As we find no differences by parity in the use
of effective methods, and yet find significant increases in unintended
and rationalized pregnancies with higher parity, we must assume that
at higher parity levels contraceptive use is less consistent (or abor-
tion less frequent). Since desire for additional children declines
with parity, it would appear that larger family size interferes with
consistent use. Among a sample of urban white couples Bumpass and
Westoff (1969) found that after the birth of a second child and after
reaching the desired number of children, the efficacy of contraceptive
practice substantially improved. Our sample is considerably different
with its restriction to women living in poverty areas, and its inclu-
sion of nonwhites and unmarried, separated and divorced women. Per-
haps it is the combination of poverty conditions with high parity which
interferes with the efficacy of contraceptive practice (and- under
pre-1973 conditions- lowered the probability of a successful abor-
tion). And perhaps it is knowledge of this effect which causes both
Black and White women of the lower class to report an expected num-
ber of children greater than their desired number (Preston, 1974).
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Among women in poverty areas in New York City, parity was found to
negatively affect desire for additional children, and positively affect
family size preference and subsequent natality. The argument that low
income women have more children because they really want more is ques-
tioned. Although stated desired family size may in general be higher
on the average among low income couples than among others at parity
levels above two, in this study only a relatively small proportion of
low income women said they wanted more children.
The stated number of children desired was higher with increasing
parity. However, in contrast to a linear increase in preferred family
size that would be predicted on the basis of "rationalization" with
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increasing parity, we found a non-linear increase with an increasing
gap that is more compatible with the "value stretch" concept of Hyman
Rodman. Women of parity three and above who had another birth during
the two-year study period reported higher family size desires in 1967
than those who remained at their 1965 parity level. An additional
pregnancy had no such effects among women with two or less children.
Our data supplement those of Haney et al. (1973) who found among a
sample of southern, urban, Black females that social class was nega-
tively associated with "value stretch" as measured by the range of
family size preferences. Although they did not test for interaction,
they found that the differences between poor and lower middle income
women were greater at parity levels above two. Although our data
support a value stretch explanation of family size preference among
low income women, the study was not designed to test such a hypothe-
sis. More studies, exploring both the psychological phenomena in-
volved in "value stretch" and their implications for attitudes and
behavior related to childbearing, would be worthwhile.
A primary purpose of public and private subsidized family plan-
ning programs is to reduce unwanted births, particularly unwanted
births among those who do not have adequate access to comprehensive
medical care. Our findings support the need for such services. Over
the two-year period of 1965-1967 the large marjority of our sample's
pregnancies were unwanted. Our findings suggest that it is important
for family planning services to reach low income women before their
first pregnancy or early in the childbearing period. The pressures
brought by poverty and high parity seem to impede the translation of
desires to regulate childbearing into effective family planning. The
expansion of high quality family planning services to the poor and the
spread of newer methods of contraception and abortion in the years
since this survey have reduced the risk of unintended births. As
ability to regulate pregnancy increases among the poor, especially in
the early stages of reproductive life, one can expect a decrease in
their stated desired number of children. Thus, we would not be sur-
prised if the inverse relationship between income and both actual and
desired number of children in the U. S. will soon be greatly reduced,
or even reverse direction.
FOOTNOTES
1. The main thrust of the argument is directed to the exclusion of
women opposed to family planning and women already practicing ade-
quate methods in estimating the need for contraceptive services of
the poor and near-poor. See Blake and Das Gupta, 1972, 1973.
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2. Color-ethnic designation was "other" or not ascertained for 2.5
percent of the sample. For earlier reports on this study see Polgar
et al., 1966; Polgar and Rothstein, 1970; Polgar and Hiday, 1974;
Hiday, 1975; and Polgar and Fried, 1976.
3. Although the sample included women whose income and education ex-
ceed the limits of common definitions of poverty, their residence
in a poverty milieu permits their description as women of low
socioeconomic status.
4. There has been much discussion in the literature over the relative
merits and psychological meaning of different questions about family
size preferences (Coombs, 1974; Abernathy and Imrey, 1975;
Namboodiri, 1970; Ryder and Westoff, 1971; Terhune and Kaufman,
1973). We prefer not to engage in such discussion in this paper,
and instead elect to choose two measures: one which refers to the
respondent's desire for more children under present circumstances,
and one which allows the respondent to imagine undoing her present
parity, beginning afresh. Question number three permits a tapping
of the husband's/friend's desire for more children under the
couple's present circumstances.
5. Only 16 of the women over 35 became pregnant in the interim and 14
of those stated that they wanted no more children prior to this
pregnancy and/or that the pregnancy was accidental. Two desired
births among women over 35 does not allow variance over four parity
levels; therefore, no significant differences could be found in
Tables IV and V for women over 35.
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